Remote Work Archives - Economic Innovation Group /topic/remote-work/ An ideas lab and advocacy organization working to forge a more dynamic U.S. economy. Tue, 08 Apr 2025 16:27:38 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0.3 Reinventing the Heartland: An Author Q&A with Nicholas Lalla /reinventing-the-heartland-with-nicholas-lalla/ Mon, 07 Apr 2025 10:00:28 +0000 /?p=23865 This article is a part of 91PORN’s Author Series, in which we invite experts from diverse backgrounds and across the ideological spectrum to explore policy issues and ideas. Here, Nicholas Lalla, Executive Leader and Founder of Tulsa Innovation Labs, discusses his new book, Reinventing the Heartland: How One City’s Inclusive Approach to Innovation and Growth [...]

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This article is a part of 91PORN’s Author Series, in which we invite experts from diverse backgrounds and across the ideological spectrum to explore policy issues and ideas. Here, Nicholas Lalla, Executive Leader and Founder of Tulsa Innovation Labs, discusses his new book, .

Note: The views below do not necessarily reflect the position of 91PORN.

Q: Start off by telling us about Tulsa’s trajectory over the last decade. What’s happening there and why should D.C. policymakers be paying attention?

Over the past ten years, Tulsa, like a lot of cities, struggled to modernize its economy. Its oil and gas base, which provided middle class jobs for generations, began experiencing more frequent disruptions — brought about by new technologies and the threat of climate change. All the while, the city bled young talent and struggled to create new firms. Without meaningful investments to diversify the economy and develop the workforce, the city fell behind regional peers.

In 2020, I founded Tulsa Innovation Labs (TIL). This tech-led economic development organization kicked off the start of a citywide effort to build the region’s innovation economy. We would go on to raise $200 million to invest in virtual health, energy tech, advanced air mobility, and cyber clusters. And today, the city is on track to create between 20,000 and 70,000 tech jobs.

While national mythology holds Silicon Valley up as the paragon of success, a midsized city in northeast Oklahoma, I contend, serves as a more realistic and replicable model for building an urban tech hub. Tulsa’s community-centered investments and Tulsa Innovation Lab’s vision of establishing the city’s tech niche should inspire other Heartland cities to pivot to tech and grow in more inclusive ways. 

Policymakers in DC need to ask themselves: what can the federal government do to support place-based economic development, aid the growth of tech jobs in the Heartland, and partner with cities like Tulsa?

Q: You were the founder and director of Tulsa Innovation Labs. How does TIL’s model differ from traditional economic development strategy?

There are three key differences. 

First, economic development organizations don’t typically focus exclusively on tech, whereas TIL only supports the growth of emerging tech clusters. Despite inequitable access, tech is the best opportunity for long-term job and wealth creation.

The criticism of Tulsa’s economic development prior to TIL was that too many organizations were taking a scattershot approach, with decisions made more by emotion than by data. The result was that capital was spread so thinly across multiple priorities that nothing ever materialized. So, the second thing that distinguishes TIL is its data-driven and focused approach: we identified a handful of priority clusters and focus solely on their development. 

And third, we approach economic development through an inclusive lens. Tulsa wants to avoid the side effects of a tech economy and ensure a broad spectrum of citizens can participate and benefit from new jobs. So, for that reason — and because TIL is backed by an anti-poverty philanthropy — TIL designs economic development investments to spur inclusive growth, with dedicated support to populations facing barriers.

Q: One common pitfall for tech-based economic development is targeting the wrong industries. Cities often select industries too far from their existing capabilities or miss out on technologies whose emergence nobody could have predicted. In Tulsa, you were very careful in choosing where leaders should focus their development resources and efforts. Talk us through how you approached this problem. 

I’m a big believer in building on what you have to become the best version of yourself. A lot of cities think attracting a new company will be their saving grace, or look to replicate Silicon Valley, or try to grow a new industry far afield from their existing employers. 

My founding vision for Tulsa Innovation Labs was to find and develop the city’s “Tech Niche” given existing assets. A city’s Tech Niche are those handful of clusters that represent the strongest opportunities for growth. 

In my book, I developed a methodology that cities can use to identify their niche. It has four parts: (1) it should build on legacy industries; (2) it should represent emerging tech clusters adjacent to existing industries; (3) it should offer a range of jobs across educational attainment levels; and (4) it should offer the opportunity for your city to lead, not serve as a supporting player. 

There are clusters, sub-clusters, and parts of an industry value chain in which cities should invest — they need to pick the best opportunities and invest heavily in them. For Tulsa and TIL, we chose virtual health, energy tech, advanced air mobility, and cyber. I understand governments and civic organizations are wary to pick winners, but that’s exactly what they need to do. 

Q: Attracting remote workers was a huge success for Tulsa. More companies are bringing their workers back to the office, but rates of remote work will remain far higher than before the pandemic. How prominent are remote work incentives going to be in the economic development toolkit going forward?

While Tulsa’s remote work incentive went viral and helped bring the city into the national conversation, I see remote work incentives as a short-term tactic rather than a long-term strategy.

That said, I do recommend midsized cities, particularly in the Heartland, to create a remote work incentive to attract tech talent. Tulsa Remote continues to bring high quality talent to the city and contribute to the economy. 

But cities shouldn’t think a remote work incentive is sufficient. To truly grow an innovation economy and sustain it over time, the local workforce needs to be well trained and aligned with industry needs. That means creating up-skilling opportunities for your local workforce is mission critical. That’s why TIL established the Cyber Skills Center in partnership with Tulsa Community College. TIL’s focus on developing the local workforce and Tulsa Remote’s attraction of new talent is a winning combination.

Despite changing policies, remote work will continue to present an opportunity to non-coastal cities to attract mobile tech talent, but such an incentive must work in tandem with upskilling local residents. 

Q: Cities are complicated places with actors and institutions holding very different visions for the future. You write a lot in the book about the challenge of wrangling these different groups toward common goals. What lessons should future leaders of similar programs take from your experience?

I think the civic class in a lot of cities can become too insular and static, leading to risk aversion and group think. Cities always need new ideas and fresh perspectives. There can sometimes be a leadership vacuum in cities that can be filled by younger, more diverse individuals.

Communities need leaders who can see cities from the outside in — who can zoom out and spot the gaps and opportunities — and ultimately build solutions.

My advice to future leaders is to have the courage to lead. You’d be surprised how hard it is to develop your own point of view, make hard choices, and have the conviction to follow through — but that’s what is needed for urban reinvention. To get big things done, leaders need to challenge the status quo, build a shared vision for growth, and assemble a coalition of the willing. 

And rather than be threatened by new perspectives, legacy institutions need to embrace change and support young leaders. And together, communities should create a culture of accountability to achieve real outcomes.

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Forget ‘return to office,’ Mr. President. This is the pro-baby way to go. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/03/04/trump-vance-remote-work-birth-rate/ Tue, 04 Mar 2025 14:06:17 +0000 /?p=23811 The post appeared first on Economic Innovation Group.

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More Disabled Americans Are Employed, Thanks to Remote Work https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-20/remote-work-helps-more-people-with-disabilities-get-employed?embedded-checkout=true Thu, 20 Jun 2024 15:06:28 +0000 /?p=23126 The post appeared first on Economic Innovation Group.

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Full vs. Hybrid: Examining the Consequences of How Americans Work Remotely /full-vs-hybrid-remote-work/ Thu, 16 Nov 2023 16:33:40 +0000 /?p=22535 By Eric Carlson, Benjamin Glasner, Adam Ozimek Too much research on remote work treats it as one uniform category of working. Although full-remote and hybrid work may seem fairly similar, the differences of their economic impacts are substantial.  In some ways, hybrid work can be more similar to in-person work, given that coming into [...]

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By Eric Carlson, Benjamin Glasner, Adam Ozimek

Too much research on remote work treats it as one uniform category of working. Although full-remote and hybrid work may seem fairly similar, the differences of their economic impacts are substantial. 

In some ways, hybrid work can be more similar to in-person work, given that coming into the office three days a week still means workers have to live within a commutable distance. What counts as an acceptable commutable distance goes up with hybrid work, but it does not eliminate the question entirely. 

In contrast, full-remote work can sever the connection between individuals and their local labor markets. This distinction doesn’t just matter for individuals but can also be consequential for local economies. The impact is apparent in so-called “Zoomtowns,” where full-remote workers are lured in by strong amenities and cheaper cost of living, despite fewer local job options. Meanwhile, cities with many job options but expensive housing are losing families as full-remote work allows them to move away without giving up their desirable big city jobs.

Using new data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), this working paper examines important differences between full-remote and hybrid work arrangements for disabled employment, long-distance migration rates, and housing price growth. 

Key findings include:

  1. Remote work generally improves employment opportunities for disabled individuals. Disabled workers are 22 percent more likely to be full-time remote than otherwise similar workers, while the impact of hybrid remote is half as large. 
  2. Remote work is increasing migration rates, but only full-remote work impacts long-distance migration rates. Hybrid remote, in contrast, impacts shorter distance moves. 
  3. Remote work has different effects on the local housing market, with full-remote work associated with stronger house price growth from 2019-2022 and hybrid remote associated with weaker house price growth. We provide preliminary evidence that these effects of remote work on housing demand are causal.

New Data on Remote Work Intensity

Until recently, the conventional wisdom was that hybrid was the most common type of remote work, while full-remote—where employees rarely or never physically come into the office—was believed to be substantially less common. However, new Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data upends this belief. BLS’ Current Population Survey (CPS) data shows that in September 2023, 10 percent of all workers were full-remote compared to 9.8 percent who were hybrid. These findings contrast with survey data from researchers at , who found that only one out of four remote workers are full-remote.

There are three additional reasons why the new BLS data is useful. First, it provides detailed demographic and economic data that enables examination of who exactly is working full-remote and who is working hybrid. Second, the survey has a large sample size and contains geographic information, which allows us to estimate how many individuals work full-remote or hybrid for a sample of metro areas. Third, the survey is conducted in person and over the phone, which avoids the risk of bias that can come from online-only surveys about remote work.

These factors make the new data useful for examining how full-remote versus hybrid matters for three important outcomes: employment of disabled individuals, migration, and housing markets.

Full-Remote Work Draws Workers with Disabilities into the Labor Market

It is no coincidence that the rise of remote work has coincided with the highest employment rates for disabled individuals in 15 years. While research has provided some empirical evidence for the relationship between full-remote work and rising employment among disabled individuals, studies to-date have been hampered by data that fail to distinguish between full-remote and hybrid. Yet, it is easy to see why this distinction is critical for disabled individuals, for many of whom the daily commute and office environment may be insurmountable barriers to work. In these cases, full-remote work can provide a previously unavailable opportunity to work, while hybrid would be of little to no help.

We explore this relationship using the detailed information in the CPS on disability, which suggests that the disabled are substantially more likely to be full-remote. Using regression analysis, we see that this is true even when controlling for education, occupation, industry of work, and a set of other individual characteristics.


A worker who reports any disability is 2.4 percent more likely to be full-remote than an otherwise similar worker. This represents a 22 percent increase in likelihood of being full-remote compared to the population-wide average of 10.7 percent. The likelihood of participating in a hybrid work arrangement among those reporting any disability is 1.1 percent higher, just under half the effect size of full-remote work arrangements.

For some types of disabilities, the distinction between full-remote and hybrid is even larger.[1] The likelihood of full-remote work is slightly higher for those with hearing (1.4 percent) or visual (2.2 percent) impairments, while workers with a disability that limits physical mobility[2] are 4.2 percent more likely to be full-remote.

Those with a physical or mental health condition with difficulties in self-care[3] saw the largest increase in the likelihood of being full-remote, up 5 percent relative to otherwise similar workers[4] —a 47 percent increase relative to the population average.

In contrast, most types of disabled workers were not likely to have hybrid work arrangements, with the exception of those with cognitive difficulties (remembering, concentrating, or making decisions), who had a 2.3 percent increase in likelihood in hybrid work relative to otherwise similar workers.

As employers consider remote work as a means to reach a wider range of potential employees and increase workforce diversity, it is important to understand the significant difference between full-remote and hybrid remote. A labor market that includes a greater number of full-remote jobs will open the door for far more otherwise qualified workers who have been unable to participate due to difficulties beyond their control. In contrast, hybrid remote would provide much less improvement in opportunity.

Only Full-Remote Work Increases Long-Distance Migration

Early evidence suggested that remote work was increasing individuals’ desire to move as early as November 2020, about nine months after shutdowns from Covid began. While subsequent research shows that remote work has influenced migration trends, our analysis directly examines whether the distinction between full-remote and hybrid work had an impact on relocation decisions.

Using the 2023 Annual Social and Economic Supplement for the CPS that includes questions about migration, we examined the difference between hybrid and full-remote’s effects on migration. Using a similar regression model as above, we examine whether workers with full-remote or hybrid jobs are more likely to have moved over the past year than otherwise similar workers. Because migration can be a household decision rather than an individual one, we conduct the analysis at the household level using the share of working adults in the household who are full-remote and the hybrid share as independent variables.

Our results show that full-remote workers are slightly more likely than hybrid workers to have moved over the past year; however, columns two through four in Table 1 show that the effect varies significantly by type of move. We find a statistically significant increase (1.7 percent) in the likelihood that a person moved out of their county if they were working full-remote—a 35.3 percent increase relative to the population average rate of moving out of one’s county (4.8 percent). Though we do not find a statistically significant impact of full-remote work on within-county moves, we do see an increase in likelihood (1.1 percent) of within-county moves linked to hybrid work arrangements, although just shy of significance with a 95 percent confidence level.

Overall, hybrid work appears to have some effect on short-distance migration. In contrast, full-remote makes one substantially more likely to make a longer-distance move. Again, we observe that the effect of remote work varies significantly depending on the nature of the remote work arrangement. The long-term impacts of remote work on migration are yet to be determined, but will surely vary depending on which kind of remote work grows more in the future.

Table 1: Effect of Remote Work on Household Moves

Remote Work Distinctions Reveal Significant, Divergent Impacts on House Prices

The fact that full-remote work has a different impact on migration than hybrid remote suggests that impacts on the housing market may differ as well. Indeed, even with less granular data on remote work, past research has shown that the impact varies by type of area. In particular, more dense and expensive cities tended to see weaker housing demand as a result of remote work while less dense, less expensive places often saw stronger housing demand. Thanks to more data on full- and hybrid remote arrangements, we examined the various impacts on the housing market stemming from different types of remote work, finding a direct impact on prices.

Using the large sample size and geographic detail of the CPS, we calculated the percent who work from home by type of remote work for 280 metro areas. For the housing market, we measured the change in average house price from 2019 to 2022 using the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey.

On average, the simple percent who work from home has an economically small and statistically insignificant impact on house price growth. However, if we measure full-remote and hybrid remote shares separately, we find that full-remote has a positive and statistically significant impact on house price growth while hybrid has a negative impact. A one percentage point increase in the share of full-remote workers is associated with about a 2 percentage point increase in the growth rate of home values between 2019 and 2022. This implies, for example, that a metro with a 10 percent full-remote share had their home values grow by 10 percentage points more than an otherwise comparable metro with a 5 percent full-remote share. In contrast, a one percentage point increase in the share of hybrid remote workers is associated with about a 2 percentage point decrease in the growth rate of home values between 2019 and 2022.

This change may be due in part to reverse causality, reflecting the movement of full-remote workers away from expensive metros rather than a higher share of local workers going full-remote who then drove up home values. Full-remote workers have more mobility as noted above; whether a place is able to attract or retain its full-remote workers can be a sign of strong demand to live there. In contrast, the results show hybrid remote workers are less likely to migrate.

To help disentangle causality, we utilize the industry, occupation, and demographic mix of a metro’s pre-pandemic residents to predict the share of each metro’s workers that would be full- and hybrid remote. Some industries and occupations have relatively higher shares of full-remote while others have relatively higher shares of hybrid remote. Figure 1 shows that while the share of full-remote and hybrid remote workers in an occupation is correlated, there is substantial variation. For example, writers and database administrators have relatively high levels of full-remote work but low levels of hybrid work, while researchers like astronomers, physicists, and natural scientists have the opposite.

Figure 1


To that end, we develop a random forest model to predict whether someone is full-remote, hybrid remote, or neither. The model is trained using 2022-2023 CPS data, which includes the actual remote status among workers, allowing us to generate predictions using individual worker characteristics from 2019 data.

A random forest classifier is a method for sorting people into categories (e.g., remote vs on-site). Like a game of “Twenty Questions,” the algorithm proceeds in a series of steps that each introduces increasingly fine amounts of detail into the classification. By the end of the process, we have a collection of digital flowcharts (each chart is a “tree” and the collection of trees gives us our “forest”) that can sort any new person in our data set into one category or the other. The advantage of a random forest over more common methods is that the algorithm can incorporate complicated interactions between variables without interaction from the researchers to specify them.[5] In this case, the random forest classifier proved a better predictor than other methods like linear probability models. For example, our random forest only has an eight percent error rate when predicting whether workers are full-remote, in contrast to the 12 percent error rate of a comparable linear probability model.[6]

We aggregate these predictions for every metro level and compare them to actual remote work percentages, generating a “predicted full-remote share” and a “predicted hybrid remote share” that is exogenous to the actual work-from-home choices of the people who live in that metro.

We also subtracted these predicted shares from the actual share of remote workers to create residual full-remote hybrid remote shares. This can be interpreted as the extent of each type of remote work above and beyond what would be predicted by the characteristics of the population. In short, we have the following remote variables:


Using this approach, we effectively split the full-remote share into two variables: predicted full-remote and residual full-remote (with the same process for the hybrid share). The models in Table 2 below show that both the predicted full-remote share and residual full-remote share are related to faster house price growth. The predicted and residual hybrid remote shares have consistently negative impacts on house price growth.

Table 2: Effect of Full-Time and Hybrid Remote Work on Home Values

The results suggest that full-remote work is more positive for housing demand while hybrid remote is more negative for housing demand. Even when we split remote work into predicted values based solely on pre-pandemic economic and demographic characteristics of the population—as well as when we use the variation in remote work that is explicitly not explained by those factors—we find the same result.

The data also allows us to examine why full-remote is more popular in some metros than in others. The share of remote work that is full-remote exhibits a strong and statistically significant relationship with pre-pandemic house prices: more expensive metros are more likely to have less full-remote work and more hybrid remote work, controlling for the overall level of remote work. One obvious explanation is that full-remote workers who lived in expensive places tended to move away, leaving those expensive places relatively absent of full-remote workers.


The housing market data illustrates the value of distinction between types of remote work for conducting analysis. While the simple measure of the share of remote workers is statistically insignificant, breaking remote into full versus hybrid remote yields two statistically significant variables that explain the 28 percent of the variation in house price growth in a population-weighted regression, and demonstrates that the effects have different directions.

Conclusion

Remote work’s  significance is only likely to grow over time. While it is tempting to look at full- and hybrid remote as subtle variations on a uniform way of working, the differences between the two can be larger than the difference between hybrid and non-remote work. For individuals with mobility challenges or comparable disabilities, requiring in-office work three times a week is just as insurmountable as working fully in-person. At the place level, hybrid work increases the commute shed of a metro area while keeping individuals effectively tied to that metro area, while full-remote work often enables a complete severance between the physical locations of workers and their employers. These differences have profound implications for housing demand and economic geography writ large.

This analysis provides empirical evidence that the effects of remote work are contingent on the distinction between full- and hybrid remote. Whenever possible, future research should attempt to distinguish between the two or provide an explanation for how heterogeneous impacts are otherwise considered.

Notes

  1. It is important to note that the CPS tends to have a .
  2. We use the variable “” to measure physical mobility, which indicates if a “respondent has any physical, mental, or emotional condition that makes it difficult or impossible to perform basic activities outside the home alone.”
  3. We use the variable “” here, which indicates if a “respondents have any physical or mental health condition that makes it difficult for them to take care of their own personal needs, such as bathing, dressing, or getting around inside the home.”
  4. We utilize regression analysis to statistically control for all other worker specific factors that affect the propensity to work remotely, allowing the results to show the impact of the variable of interest compared to an otherwise similar worker.
  5. Our model includes information about education, sex, race, age, disability status, industry, and occupation. We use the ranger package in R. Data and replication code are available upon request.
  6. To evaluate the models’ predictions, we reserve 80 percent of the data set for estimation (our “training set”) and fit our models to the remaining 20 percent (our “testing set”). The reported error rates are based on predictions using this smaller testing set.

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Remote Work Is Less Common Than We Thought /remote-work-in-2022/ Mon, 02 Oct 2023 17:16:30 +0000 /?p=22477 by Adam Ozimek and Eric Carlson Key stats A new estimate of remote work from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) suggests that remote work is less common than previously thought. While the new BLS data reveals hybrid remote work to be substantially lower than other surveys estimated, fully remote work is close to [...]

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by Adam Ozimek and Eric Carlson

Key stats

  • A new estimate of remote work from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) suggests that remote work is less common than previously thought.
  • While the new BLS data reveals hybrid remote work to be substantially lower than other surveys estimated, fully remote work is close to where other surveys show, at around one out of ten workers. 
  • As a result, fully remote work appears slightly more common than hybrid remote work. 
  • Another new estimate of remote work by the U.S. Census Bureau shows that the highest work-from-home (WFH) places have seen the largest declines in WFH, with some low WFH places seeing an increase. The 10th percentile is now 6.3 percent and the 90th percentile is 29.8 percent. 
  • Despite some convergence, Southern states still lag with less than 3 percent of workers remote, while more than 30 percent are remote in parts of the Northeast Corridor, the Pacific Northwest, and Northern California

From increased household formation and housing demand to increased fertility rates, remote work has left its mark on the American economy. But with employers calling for , is remote work becoming a thing of the Covid past? New data from two government surveys sheds light on how remote work is evolving both at the national level and in communities across the U.S. The first survey from the BLS shows that remote work is both less common than shown in other surveys and also that a greater share of workers are fully remote. Over the last year, remote-working rates have declined somewhat but remain significantly elevated above pre-pandemic levels. The second survey, from the Census Bureau, shows that remote work remains highly uneven across the U.S., with some places having more than a third of their workforce remote while other  places having barely any. However, there is some convergence occurring, with the most remote places seeing declines, and the least remote places seeing some increase. 

Revising Remote Work

There are a variety of estimates of the share of the workforce that is remote, and these sources have differences owing to sampling methods, coverage universe, and other . Last week, the BLS published of remote work from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is the monthly survey used to measure the unemployment rate and other important labor market indicators. Starting in October of 2022, the BLS began collecting data on how many people were working remotely, including a question about pre-pandemic workplace. The CPS is a generally reliable survey, making it a useful complement to other surveys. Importantly, the CPS is and is thus free of measurement bias that can come from online panels. 

The headline is that remote working has still increased dramatically compared to before the pandemic, but is substantially less common than previous surveys suggested. In August 2023, the most recent data available, ​​19.5 percent of workers ages 16 and up teleworked or worked at home in a given week. In contrast, data from , jointly run by the University of Chicago, ITAM, MIT, and Stanford University, and is among the most commonly cited WFH data, suggests 45.9 percent working remotely in that same month.

Figure 1. Source: telework estimates and

Part of the gap may be due to the sample universe. For example, WFH Research includes full-time wage and salary workers who earn more than $10,000 a year, while the headline CPS estimate includes all professionals at work, regardless of average earnings. Yet if we look at the full-time remote work rate in the CPS, the remote rate only increases to 20.7 percent, closing very little of the gap. 

Another substantial difference between the CPS and WFH Research data is that fully remote makes up a far larger share of remote workers in the CPS. In the CPS, 53 percent of remote workers are fully remote, while WFH Research puts this at 26 percent. Indeed, as a share of workers, both sources are much closer when it comes to the fully remote share of the workforce, with the CPS at 10.3 percent and WFH Research at 12.1 percent. To the extent we should revise down our estimates of remote workers as a result of this new data, it is almost entirely fewer hybrid workers. If the CPS is correct, fully remote is actually slightly more common. 

While the downward revision in the share working hybrid remote suggests a smaller change in the economy than previously thought, it is nevertheless still a massive shift. The CPS question about pre-pandemic remote working suggests 9.4 percent of people worked remotely. This share suggests a doubling has occurred. Again, this is substantially below the six-fold increase found by WFH Research, but nevertheless one out of five workers is now remote, and one in ten is fully remote. Looking at the college educated, it is nearly one in five who are fully remote. Among advanced degree holders, nearly 40 percent are hybrid or fully remote. Among skilled workers, remote working is now a substantial share of the labor force, including fully remote. 

Importantly, the data shows remote work is stable over the last year, and if anything, has increased slightly. There is no sign that return-to-office is gaining steam on a national scale.  

Future work will need to reconcile the sources of discrepancy between the various measures. But the CPS provides another data point in favor of an estimate of somewhere around one in five workers remote, consistent with work from , who estimate a 2023 remote work rate of 19 percent using American Time Use Survey, another BLS product. 

The shifting geography of remote work 

Data from the 2022 release of the American Community Survey (ACS) also suggests remote work remains well above pre-pandemic rates, but did decline in 2022 in most places. However, because the ACS remote work question is somewhat vague, it is somewhat limited for national remote work trends, but the large sample size makes it the best survey for examining geographic patterns of remote work. The data in 2022 shows that the most remote work-heavy places saw the biggest declines, while remote work increased in the 10 percent of places with the least remote working. 

It is worth digging a bit more into the limitations of ACS data for better understanding of remote work trends. The biggest shortcoming of this data is that it uses a binary measure of remote working, based on someone’s primary “mode of transportation to work.” However, the biggest advantage of the survey is that the question has been asked consistently over time and that it contains a very fine level of geographic information. The ACS provides the share of workers who work from home at the (PUMA) level. PUMAs are non-overlapping geographic regions defined by the Census Bureau. Each PUMA covers part of a state and contains at least 100,000 people. By virtue of its granularity, PUMA level data offer a detailed picture of the geography of remote work. 

Nationally, the share of workers who work remotely remains well above pre-pandemic levels despite a 3 percentage point decrease from 2021. As shown in Figure 2, the rate of working from home dropped from 18 percent in 2021 to just over 15 percent in 2022, much higher than the 6 percent of workers working from home in 2019. lead to different estimates of the level of remote working at any given point in time. Yet, both and estimates agree with the broad trend that remote work has declined from the pandemic peak but remains substantially above pre-pandemic levels. This broad trend masks the wide geographic disparity in the prevalence of remote work across the county. 

Figure 2. Source: Author’s calculations of ACS data

As shown in Figure 3, 2021 displayed a wide geographic disparity in work from home rates, ranging from 5.5 percent at the 10th percentile to 38.5 percent at the 90th percentile. However, the data also show evidence of convergence in remote work between regions. PUMAs with initially high shares of working from home experienced significant declines in remote work share while PUMAs with the lowest initial shares of working from home experienced increases in remote work. In 2022, 6.3 percent of workers in PUMAs in the 10th percentile worked remotely while 29.8 percent of workers in PUMAs in the 90th percentile worked from home. 

Figure 3. Source: Author’s calculations of ACS data

For example, in San Francisco, CA, 53 percent of workers worked from home in 2021 while only 33 percent of workers worked from home in 2022. Similarly, 55 percent of workers in Washington, D.C. worked remotely in 2021 compared to 34 percent in 2022. In contrast, Tarrant County, just outside of Dallas, TX, went from 10 percent remote in 2021 up to 19 percent remote in 2022. 

As shown in Figure 4, remote work remains strong in the Northeast Corridor, the Pacific Northwest, and in Northern California but remains low in many Southern states like Mississippi and Tennessee. The five PUMAs with the greatest share of workers working remotely in 2022 were the Northwestern part of Alameda County, CA; the Western portion of Washington, D.C.; the Northwestern part of Wake County, NC; Downtown Seattle, WA; and the Northern part of Arlington County, VA. The five PUMAs with the lowest share of workers working remotely in 2022 were the East Central region of Mississippi; the Northeastern region of Mississippi; the North Central region of Mississippi; South Central Los Angeles, CA; and Ector County, TX.

Figure 4. Source: Author’s calculations of ACS data

Some of the regions that experienced increases in remote work were areas just outside of regions that had high remote shares in 2021 (Figure 5). For example, parts of Texas like Hays County outside of Austin showed increases in remote work, while the city of Austin experienced a decline in its remote share. This change could reflect relocation on the part of remote workers as part of remote work’s “” on urban areas. However, in general, declines in working from home tended to be large while increases in remote work tended to be modest. 

Figure 5. Source: Author’s calculations of ACS data

The reasons for these changes are unclear but can be explored as more data becomes available. One possible explanation is an occupational composition effect. For example, in 2021 people whose jobs could be done remotely worked from home while many with in-person jobs left the workforce. However, as COVID restrictions waned, people with in-person jobs could work again in 2022. Another possible explanation is a relocation effect. Some remote workers may have left dense urban areas for regions with more space. As a result, we see the declining rate of working from home in big cities and the increasing rate of working from home in less urban settings. 

Remote work has changed the landscape of the American economy. While its prevalence has declined in some regions, it remains a significant part of how we work today. It is unlikely that the American economy has settled into a new equilibrium. Policymakers will need to pay attention to these shifts as they have implications for housing, transportation, and urban development.

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The Evolving Effect of Remote Work on Geography /remote-work-geography/ Thu, 25 May 2023 17:32:41 +0000 /?p=22126 by Adam Ozimek A growing body of research has demonstrated the impacts of remote work on where people live. In 2021, economists Arjun Ramani and Nick Bloom coined the exodus from expensive city centers to surrounding suburbs and exurbs “The Donut Effect” due to how changes in housing prices appeared on a map. As research [...]

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by Adam Ozimek

A growing body of research has demonstrated the impacts of remote work on where people live. In 2021, economists Arjun Ramani and Nick Bloom coined the exodus from expensive city centers to surrounding suburbs and exurbs due to how changes in housing prices appeared on a map. As research in this area continues to grow, it’s important to recognize one fact: the geography of remote work is both heterogeneous and still evolving. To this end, this short analysis will illustrate how housing prices have evolved across regions from the start of the pandemic through the most recent data available through April 2023. 

While the Donut Effect focuses on how prices relate to metro areas’ central business districts and suburban or exurban places, research has suggested that it is the most expensive and dense places that have seen the biggest declines in population and housing demand as a result of remote work. Using Zillow’s Home Value Indexes, this analysis presents a data-oriented perspective on the Donut Effect, focusing on the relationship between changes in house prices at the zip code-level and pre-pandemic housing prices. 

This analysis uses binned scatterplots to compare cumulative change in house prices throughout the pandemic to initial, pre-pandemic prices to characterize the Donut Effect. To illustrate heterogeneity, we focus on regional differences in the evolution of the Donut Effect as categorized by the

A look at the West Census Region shows a relatively consistent Donut Effect, which became notable by the end of 2020 and has gradually strengthened over the pandemic and recovery periods. Comparing mid-2022 to today reveals that the more expensive end has moved downward, indicating that the Donut Effect is strengthening.

The Donut Effect is clear across the Northeast Census Region by the end of 2020, and remains present throughout the pandemic including up through 2023; however, it had weakened somewhat by late 2021, with a relatively flatter trend line and increasing convergence between the most expensive places and those in the mid-tier. The Donut Effect began to strengthen entering 2023.

The feature that characterizes the Donut Effect in the Northeast Region is the performance of mid-priced places, which have done relatively well. Though the least expensive places have done better, the middle tier (home values around $200,000 to $250,000) held up relatively well. 

The Donut Effect is present throughout the Midwest Region, where the lowest-cost places have seen substantially more increases in price than other regions. Low cost may be a more important factor in the Midwest than in other regions, perhaps as a result of less need to be relatively close to large, more expensive urban areas. 

Finally we look at the South region, where a strong Donut Effect is apparent by the end of 2020; however, the donut weakens and essentially disappears throughout 2021. Towards the end of 2022 and into 2023, the donut begins to reappear. Like the Midwest, the lowest-cost places stand out, while the most expensive places have begun to fall in value within the most recent months. 

Indeed, simply looking at a map of price changes in the last 8 months, the Donut Effect in the South is abundantly clear. As house prices are falling, they are doing so in a Donut Effect-shaped pattern. 

While regional heterogeneity is clear, across most regions it appears the Donut Effect has been strengthening recently. Indeed, it is worthwhile to zoom in on the most recent changes to see how the evolution of the Donut Effect has developed since August 2022, when national housing prices peaked in the Zillow indexes—one can observe heterogeneity during this period that mirrors the trends discussed above. In the West and South, the Donut Effect in general has strengthened in the last eight months as low-cost places are seeing gains and other, more expensive groups see declines map closely to pre-pandemic expensiveness. Mid-cost places have performed better over the last six months in the Northeast, while the most expensive places and some cheaper places have seen the biggest declines. The Donut Effect is strengthening in the Midwest as the least expensive places have seen the strongest price growth. 

In short, the data suggest that the Donut Effect is present across the U.S. but reveal differing trends across regions. Importantly, when only focusing on certain parts of the country, the Donut Effect appears to have weakened or even disappeared beginning in 2021. In reality, the effects have been strengthening across all regions since housing prices peaked in mid-2022, suggesting that remote work’s effects on economic geography have not yet reached an equilibrium. 

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Americans no longer want to move for work. Here’s why. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/moving-for-work-mobilty-record-low-1-6-percent-challenger/ Fri, 19 May 2023 21:33:47 +0000 /?p=22147 After two years of grousing that no one wants to work anymore, America's employers might have a new line of complaint: No one wants to move. After steadily falling for decades, the rate of Americans moving for work fell to a record low of just 1.6% in the first three months of the year, according [...]

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After two years of grousing that no one wants to work anymore, America’s employers might have a new line of complaint: No one wants to move.

After steadily falling for decades, the rate of Americans moving for work fell to a record low of just 1.6% in the first three months of the year, according to Challenger, Gray & Christmas.

“This is the lowest quarterly result that we’ve seen, among all the job seekers we’ve worked with, since 1986,” the company’s senior vice president, Andrew Challenger, told CBS MoneyWatch.

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Why are rents still sky-high? https://www.businessinsider.com/why-apartment-rent-high-pandemic-big-cities-household-formation-roommates-2023-5 Wed, 10 May 2023 17:25:09 +0000 /?p=22058 When remote workers fled big cities during the COVID-19 pandemic's initial wave, the country's priciest places suddenly found themselves reeling from a dramatic increase in the number of empty apartments. From New York to San Francisco, rents were in free fall. Deals that might have been unthinkable just a few months prior — $1,000-plus discounts [...]

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When remote workers fled big cities during the COVID-19 pandemic’s initial wave, the country’s priciest places suddenly found themselves reeling from a dramatic increase in the number of empty apartments. From New York to San Francisco, rents were in free fall. Deals that might have been unthinkable just a few months prior — $1,000-plus discounts on luxury apartments, for example — became reality. Moving companies were slammed with clients looking to abandon crowded urban centers. While some landlords slashed rents by more than half, others glumly hung on to vacant units.

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Has Denver lost its edge? Colorado’s biggest counties are losing population https://www.denverpost.com/2023/04/18/colorado-population-declines-outmigration-housing-costs-remote-work/ Tue, 18 Apr 2023 19:06:42 +0000 /?p=22018 The entire northern Front Range, especially metro Denver, was a hot spot coming out of the Great Recession, drawing in young workers from all over the country and powering one of the fastest-growing economies of any region in the years before the pandemic. But that important driver of growth looks like it has stalled and [...]

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The entire northern Front Range, especially metro Denver, was a hot spot coming out of the Great Recession, drawing in young workers from all over the country and powering one of the fastest-growing economies of any region in the years before the pandemic. But that important driver of growth looks like it has stalled and even reversed.

Colorado may have both welcomed and feared the disproportionate flow of new residents last decade. But this decade it will need to find a way to attract its share from a shrinking pool of new workers, and early on it looks like it is falling behind.

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Remote Work and Household Formation /remote-work-household-formation/ /remote-work-household-formation/#respond Wed, 12 Apr 2023 13:45:34 +0000 /?p=21997 Download the White Paper by Adam Ozimek and Eric Carlson Download Abstract If remote work has reduced the demand for living in big cities, then why have their rents gone up so much? In this paper, we argue that one key to this question lies in understanding the [...]

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Download the White Paper

by Adam Ozimek and Eric Carlson

Abstract

If remote work has reduced the demand for living in big cities, then why have their rents gone up so much? In this paper, we argue that one key to this question lies in understanding the heterogeneous effects of remote work on housing demand. Consistent with the emerging literature, we show that remote work in expensive and dense places causes less housing demand through out-migration, which helps to explain why big cities have seen declining population and relatively weaker rents and house prices. However, we show that is counterbalanced by remote work also causing a surge in household formation. Methodologically, this paper adds to the growing body of remote work literature by being the first to use actual, post-pandemic remote work rates at a granular level as an instrumental variable. At the individual level, we utilize occupation and industry fixed-effect IVs, and at local housing market level we utilize a shift-share approach. The causal effect of remote work on housing markets is consistent with OLS, suggesting modestly larger effects for both individual and housing market models.

Conclusion

In this paper we explore how remote work affected housing demand at both a micro level and an aggregate level. Methodologically, this paper adds to the growing body of remote work literature by being the first to use actual, post-pandemic remote work rates at a granular level as an instrumental variable. At the individual level, we utilize occupation and industry fixed effect IVs, and at the local housing market level we utilize a shift-share approach. The causal effect of remote work on housing markets is consistent with OLS.

We find that remote work has increased the demand for housing at both the intensive and extensive margins for households and individuals. Remote households spent more on rent and mortgages than otherwise comparable non-remote households. In addition, remote households were more likely to have moved into their home within the last 12 months, and individuals who worked remotely were more likely to head their own households. All individual level effects are larger when using IV approaches.

In general, exposure to remote work led to increases in housing demand as shown, for example, through gross monthly rental payments and home values. However, this effect was smaller for PUMAs with high population densities and expensive housing markets. Indeed, we find a negative effect of remote work exposure on population growth the most dense and expensive PUMAs, suggesting that working from home led to some level of out-migration from these areas. However, in these dense and expensive PUMAs, the positive effect on the household formation helped offset the population loss. In short, one reason places that lost population nevertheless saw robust housing markets was that they had stronger household formation.

This paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we build on the existing literature by being the first study to use 2021 ACS data to examine the effects of remote work on individual level outcomes. Second, we use actual post-pandemic remote work rates to construct instrumental variables for working from home. Lastly, we extend the prior research by focusing on household formation as an important extensive margin of household demand.

This paper also opens up potential avenues for subsequent research into the economic geography of remote work and the future of cities. For example, our research has shown that remote work has changed the way that people live within dense and expensive urban areas. Working from home has led to both an out-migration from city centers as well as increased headship rates in those same areas. It remains an open question to estimate the magnitude of the effects of these changes on local economies and governments.

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